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  ALCM	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  missile	  AWACS	   Airborne	  Warning	  and	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  BMD	   Ballistic	  missile	  defense	  C2	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  and	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  missile	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  ballistic	  missile	  LACM	   Land-­‐attack	  cruise	  missile	  LeT	   Lashkar-­‐e-­‐Taiba	  LoC	   Line	  of	  Control	  MEZ	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  patrol	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  OOB	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  of	  battle	  PAF	   Pakistan	  Air	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  SAM	   Surface-­‐to-­‐air	  missile	  SLCM	   Submarine-­‐launched	  cruise	  missile	  SSBN	   Nuclear-­‐powered	  ballistic	  missile	  submarine	  SSGN	   Nuclear-­‐powered	  guided	  missile	  submarine	  TNW	   Tactical	  nuclear	  weapon	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  Asian	  Stability	  Workshop:	  	  A	  Crisis	  Simulation	  Exercise	  
 
1	  
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY The	  South	  Asian	  Stability	  Workshop	  was	  a	  crisis	  simulation	  exercise	  held	  19-­‐22	  March	  in	  Colombo,	  Sri	  Lanka,	  organized	  by	  the	  Center	  on	  Contemporary	  Conflict	  at	  the	  U.S.	  Naval	  Postgraduate	  School.	  	  The	  simulation	  convened	  retired	  Indian	  and	  Pakistani	  senior	  military	  officers	  and	  civilian	  analysts	  into	  two	  teams	  based	  on	  country	  of	  origin	  (India	  and	  Pakistan).	  	  Participants	  were	  confronted	  with	  a	  simulated	  geopolitical	  scenario	  and	  crisis	  triggering	  event,	  set	  in	  the	  year	  2018.	  	  The	  simulation	  lasted	  for	  three	  “moves”	  and	  was	  moderated	  by	  a	  Control	  Group	  consisting	  primarily	  of	  U.S.	  experts	  on	  south	  Asian	  security.	  The	  simulation	  begins	  with	  a	  terrorist	  attack	  at	  a	  cricket	  match	  in	  Jaipur	  in	  November	  2018	  that	  kills	  the	  Indian	  defense	  minister	  and	  hundreds	  of	  spectators.	  	  Evidence	  traces	  the	  attack	  to	  Lashkar-­‐e-­‐Taiba	  (LeT)	  in	  Pakistan,	  and	  Indian	  intelligence	  claims	  that	  some	  elements	  of	  the	  Pakistani	  government	  were	  complicit.	  	  Diplomacy	  fails	  to	  defuse	  tensions;	  the	  India	  team	  subsequently	  enforces	  a	  “Maritime	  Exclusion	  Zone”	  (MEZ)	  off	  the	  Makran	  coast	  and	  begins	  air,	  artillery,	  and	  special	  forces	  strikes	  against	  Pakistani	  infrastructure	  and	  military	  targets	  along	  the	  Line	  of	  Control	  (LoC)	  in	  Kashmir.	  	  Specific	  targets	  included	  brigade	  headquarters,	  bridges,	  and	  alleged	  terrorist	  training	  camps.	  	  The	  Pakistan	  team	  was	  surprised	  by	  the	  intensity	  of	  India’s	  operations	  and	  interpreted	  them	  as	  formal	  acts	  of	  war.	  	  This	  reconfirms	  how	  non-­‐state	  actors	  such	  as	  LeT	  could	  trigger	  a	  major	  crisis	  in	  South	  Asia	  at	  a	  moment’s	  notice.	  Over	  three	  moves	  spanning	  nine	  “in-­‐game”	  days,	  what	  began	  as	  a	  limited	  war	  escalated	  quickly	  to	  a	  full-­‐scale	  war.	  	  Although	  the	  India	  team’s	  initial	  intent	  was	  to	  conduct	  limited,	  punitive	  strikes	  against	  Pakistan,	  military	  necessity	  on	  both	  sides	  led	  to	  extensive	  mobilizations	  and	  horizontal	  escalation.	  	  By	  the	  end	  of	  the	  third	  move,	  Pakistan	  was	  preparing	  to	  release	  warheads	  to	  its	  Strategic	  Forces	  Commands,	  readying	  nuclear	  missile	  launchers	  for	  possible	  battlefield	  deployment,	  and	  conducting	  nuclear	  signaling	  through	  missile	  tests	  and	  public	  statements.	  	  The	  exercise	  concluded	  at	  this	  point	  when	  neither	  side	  was	  able	  to	  terminate	  the	  war	  on	  its	  terms.	  Our	  findings	  from	  the	  simulation	  exercise	  lead	  us	  to	  conclude	  that	  a	  limited	  war	  in	  South	  Asia	  will	  escalate	  rapidly	  into	  a	  full	  war	  with	  a	  high	  potential	  for	  nuclear	  exchange.	  Four	  key	  factors	  observed	  during	  the	  simulation	  support	  this	  conclusion.	  First,	  the	  enduring	  rivalry,	  chronic	  mistrust,	  and	  entrenched	  threat	  perceptions	  between	  India	  and	  Pakistan	  can	  encourage	  excessive	  military	  actions	  during	  wartime.	  	  Even	  during	  peacetime,	  these	  enduring	  rivalries	  heighten	  bilateral	  tensions	  and	  undermine	  deterrence	  stability.	  	  By	  assuming	  the	  worst	  from	  one	  another,	  India	  and	  Pakistan	  can	  exacerbate	  their	  security	  dilemma	  and	  ensnare	  themselves	  in	  a	  perpetual	  action-­‐reaction	  cycle	  of	  arms	  development.	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Second,	  limited	  war	  for	  India	  is	  a	  full-­‐scale	  war	  for	  Pakistan.	  Pakistan	  considers	  India’s	  present	  and	  growing	  conventional	  force	  advantage	  an	  existential	  threat	  and	  keeps	  its	  nuclear	  option	  open.	  	  If	  the	  Indian	  army	  and	  air	  force	  strike	  Pakistani	  military	  targets	  and	  the	  navy	  declares	  a	  MEZ	  against	  the	  Pakistani	  coastline,	  Pakistan	  would	  consider	  this	  an	  act	  of	  war.	  	  Such	  a	  conflict	  would	  escalate	  rapidly.	  	  Nevertheless,	  this	  report	  concludes	  that	  a	  conflict	  might	  remain	  limited	  if	  Indian	  aggression	  is	  restricted	  to	  one-­‐off	  airstrikes	  against	  terrorist	  targets	  situated	  in	  the	  disputed	  territory	  of	  Jammu	  and	  Kashmir.	  	  	  Third,	  India’s	  conventional	  force	  advantage	  creates	  an	  incentive	  to	  employ	  its	  forces	  maximally	  on	  land,	  sea,	  and/or	  air	  in	  order	  to	  achieve	  a	  quick	  and	  decisive	  effect.	  	  Doing	  so	  runs	  the	  risk	  of	  an	  escalation	  spiral	  that	  makes	  war	  termination	  difficult.	  	  In	  its	  fixation	  to	  punish	  Pakistan,	  India	  may	  also	  lack	  a	  clear	  and	  practicable	  de-­‐escalation	  strategy,	  believing	  that	  the	  international	  community	  will	  play	  this	  role	  in	  its	  favor.	  Fourth,	  as	  a	  limited	  war	  escalates	  horizontally	  and	  vertically,	  Pakistan	  will	  face	  intense	  pressure	  to	  lower	  its	  nuclear	  threshold.	  	  As	  witnessed	  during	  the	  simulation,	  Pakistan	  opted	  to	  signal	  nuclear	  resolve	  through	  public	  statements,	  missile	  tests,	  and	  threatened	  field	  deployment	  of	  delivery	  systems,	  including	  such	  short	  range	  systems	  as	  the	  Hatf-­‐IX/Nasr.	  	  Yet	  India	  was	  undeterred	  by	  Pakistani	  actions	  in	  the	  simulation	  and	  indicated	  that	  it	  would	  attack	  any	  deployed	  Nasr	  units	  it	  detected,	  regardless	  of	  whether	  the	  payload	  was	  nuclear	  or	  conventional.	  	  The	  complexity	  and	  uncertainty	  surrounding	  nuclear	  deployment	  in	  the	  midst	  of	  a	  conventional	  war	  could	  therefore	  result	  in	  an	  inadvertent	  or	  deliberate	  escalation	  culminating	  in	  a	  nuclear	  exchange.	  Although	  war-­‐games	  and	  crisis	  simulations	  are	  not	  necessarily	  predictive	  of	  real-­‐world	  outcomes,	  the	  South	  Asian	  Stability	  Workshop	  provided	  significant	  insight	  into	  regional	  escalation	  dynamics	  during	  a	  period	  of	  crisis.	  	  With	  India	  and	  Pakistan	  embattled	  in	  a	  full-­‐scale	  war	  by	  the	  end	  of	  the	  third	  move,	  with	  poor	  outlook	  for	  disengagement,	  the	  simulation	  highlights	  the	  need	  for	  confidence-­‐building	  measures	  and	  a	  strategic	  restraint	  regime	  that	  nurtures	  détente.	  	  In	  the	  event	  of	  a	  crisis,	  international	  intervention	  and	  diplomacy	  must	  be	  swift	  in	  order	  to	  cool	  tensions	  and	  prevent	  full-­‐scale	  conflict.	  	  Additional	  simulation	  exercises	  may	  focus	  on	  escalation	  dynamics	  and	  nuclear	  thresholds	  in	  the	  fog	  of	  war	  as	  well	  as	  crisis	  diplomacy,	  de-­‐escalation,	  and	  war	  termination	  strategies.	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PROJECT OBJECTIVE The	  South	  Asian	  Stability	  Workshop	  was	  a	  crisis	  simulation	  exercise	  held	  in	  Colombo,	  Sri	  Lanka	  on	  19-­‐22	  March	  2013.	  	  Participants	  were	  comprised	  of	  Indian,	  Pakistan,	  and	  U.S.	  former	  military	  officers,	  civilians,	  and	  academics.	  	  The	  simulation	  involved	  dividing	  the	  Indian	  and	  Pakistani	  participants	  into	  teams	  based	  on	  country	  of	  origin	  and	  playing	  three	  moves	  within	  the	  context	  of	  a	  hypothetical	  crisis	  scenario,	  set	  in	  the	  year	  2018.	  	  The	  simulation	  was	  not	  a	  tactical-­‐level	  war-­‐game,	  but	  rather	  an	  operational/strategic-­‐level	  exercise.	  	  	  The	  simulation	  exercise	  was	  designed	  to	  reinforce	  our	  theoretical	  understanding	  of	  India-­‐Pakistan	  strategic	  stability	  with	  practical,	  conceptual	  clarity.	  	  	  Although	  Track	  II	  dialogues	  and	  academic	  conferences	  have	  been	  useful	  for	  developing	  a	  robust	  theoretical	  understanding	  of	  strategic	  stability,	  the	  South	  Asian	  Stability	  Workshop	  provided	  a	  laboratory	  in	  which	  these	  theoretical	  hypotheses	  could	  be	  explored	  and	  stress-­‐tested.	  The	  purpose	  of	  the	  event	  was	  to	  examine	  crisis	  decision-­‐making	  processes	  and	  escalation	  dynamics	  in	  South	  Asia.	  	  Given	  the	  complex	  interplay	  between	  subconventional,	  conventional,	  and	  nuclear	  forces	  on	  the	  subcontinent,	  coupled	  with	  military	  doctrinal	  evolution,	  technological	  maturation,	  and	  the	  lack	  of	  a	  viable	  strategic	  restraint	  regime,	  the	  potential	  for	  escalation	  is	  significant	  and	  deserving	  of	  analysis.	  By	  convening	  Indian	  and	  Pakistani	  participants	  to	  compose	  the	  respective	  country	  teams,	  our	  intention	  was	  to	  emulate	  real-­‐world	  military	  decision-­‐making	  dynamics	  and	  escalatory	  pressures	  as	  closely	  as	  possible.	  	  By	  setting	  the	  geopolitical	  scenario	  in	  2018,	  our	  intention	  was	  to	  emulate	  current	  strategic	  dynamics	  in	  a	  relatively	  proximate	  timeframe,	  while	  simultaneously	  distancing	  the	  participants	  from	  present-­‐day	  political	  sensitivities	  that	  might	  otherwise	  constrain	  their	  behavior	  during	  the	  simulation.	  	  The	  year	  2018	  is	  also	  a	  symbolic	  one,	  marking	  the	  20th	  anniversary	  of	  the	  Indian	  and	  Pakistani	  nuclear	  tests.	  In	  summary,	  our	  objective	  was	  not	  to	  shape	  Indian	  and	  Pakistani	  policy	  or	  encourage	  war-­‐fighting,	  but	  to	  gain	  a	  better	  understanding	  of	  escalatory	  dynamics	  under	  a	  nuclear	  overhang.	  	  All	  participants	  during	  the	  workshop	  interacted	  in	  a	  friendly,	  frank,	  and	  professional	  manner.	  	  We	  expect	  the	  lessons	  learned	  from	  this	  event	  will	  help	  stakeholders	  bridge	  strategic	  communication	  gaps,	  nurture	  areas	  of	  collaboration	  for	  durable	  peace	  and	  security,	  and	  foster	  confidence-­‐building	  between	  the	  United	  States,	  India,	  and	  Pakistan.	  	  	  
	    
	   
4	  
SIMULATION MECHANICS The	  crisis	  simulation	  exercise	  divided	  participants	  into	  an	  India	  team	  and	  Pakistan	  team,	  based	  on	  their	  country	  of	  origin.	  	  The	  country	  teams	  were	  asked	  to	  play	  three	  “moves”	  in	  the	  wake	  of	  a	  hypothetical	  crisis	  triggering	  event	  that	  occurs	  on	  22	  November	  2018.	  	  A	  Control	  Group	  moderated	  the	  simulation,	  provided	  political	  guidance	  and	  intelligence	  updates	  to	  the	  country	  teams,	  and	  adjudicated	  the	  results	  of	  each	  move.	  	  The	  country	  teams	  were	  instructed	  to	  keep	  their	  moves	  at	  the	  operational/strategic	  level,	  as	  the	  simulation	  was	  not	  meant	  to	  be	  a	  tactical-­‐level	  war-­‐game.	  	  The	  country	  teams	  were	  also	  instructed	  not	  to	  share	  their	  plans	  with	  members	  of	  the	  opposite	  team	  until	  the	  conclusion	  of	  the	  event.	  	  	  During	  each	  move,	  the	  country	  teams	  were	  required	  to	  decide	  their	  diplomatic	  and	  military	  courses	  of	  action	  and	  send	  these	  plans	  to	  the	  Control	  Group.	  	  After	  receiving	  both	  teams’	  plans,	  the	  Control	  Group	  would	  convene	  in	  private	  to	  adjudicate	  the	  move.	  	  The	  adjudication	  process	  involved	  studying	  both	  teams’	  plans	  and	  determining	  the	  political	  and	  military	  outcomes	  for	  that	  particular	  move.	  	  Based	  on	  the	  Control	  adjudication,	  the	  country	  teams	  planned	  their	  subsequent	  move	  accordingly;	  this	  process	  repeated	  until	  the	  end	  of	  the	  simulation	  at	  Move	  #3.	  	  	  At	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  simulation,	  the	  Control	  Group	  presented	  a	  hypothetical	  geopolitical	  scenario	  set	  in	  the	  year	  2018.	  	  The	  country	  teams	  were	  also	  provided	  with	  an	  order	  of	  battle	  (OOB)	  that	  exhaustively	  detailed	  Indian	  and	  Pakistani	  military	  capabilities	  in	  2018.	  After	  receiving	  the	  2018	  geopolitical	  scenario	  briefing,	  the	  country	  teams	  received	  tailored	  control	  briefings	  in	  their	  respective	  cells,	  which	  served	  as	  the	  “political	  guidance.”	  	  The	  political	  guidance	  consisted	  of	  goals	  and	  instructions	  designed	  to	  constrain	  the	  country	  teams	  from	  drafting	  unrealistic	  plans.	  	  Based	  on	  this	  political	  guidance,	  the	  country	  teams	  developed	  baseline	  diplomatic/military	  plans	  (high	  and	  low	  option)	  and	  privately	  briefed	  them	  to	  the	  Control	  Group.	  	  The	  Control	  Group	  subsequently	  convened	  a	  global	  plenary	  session	  to	  announce	  the	  crisis	  triggering	  event	  –	  a	  terrorist	  attack	  in	  Jaipur,	  which	  India	  has	  attributed	  to	  Lashkar-­‐e-­‐Taiba	  with	  alleged	  Pakistani	  government	  complicity.	  	  This	  triggering	  event	  set	  the	  stage	  for	  the	  commencement	  of	  Move	  #1.	  At	  the	  beginning	  of	  Move	  #3,	  teams	  were	  instructed	  to	  provide	  their	  war	  termination	  goals,	  in	  addition	  to	  providing	  their	  diplomatic/military	  courses	  of	  action.	  	  The	  simulation	  concluded	  with	  a	  global	  plenary	  session	  in	  which	  the	  India,	  Pakistan,	  and	  Control	  teams	  convened	  in	  an	  open	  forum	  to	  discuss	  the	  outcome	  of	  Move	  #3	  and	  lessons	  learned	  from	  the	  event	  as	  a	  whole.	  	  




Tuesday,	  19	  March	  
§ Game	  mechanics	  briefing	  
§ Geopolitical	  scenario	  briefing	  
§ Control	  briefing	  –	  political	  guidance	  
§ Team	  baseline	  planning	  sessions	  
Wednesday,	  20	  March	  
§ Crisis	  triggering	  event	  briefing	  
§ Team	  Move	  #1	  planning	  sessions	  
Thursday,	  21	  March	  
§ Control	  adjudication	  briefing	  for	  Move	  #1	  
§ Team	  Move	  #2	  planning	  sessions	  
§ Control	  adjudication	  briefing	  for	  Move	  #2	  
§ Team	  Move	  #3	  planning	  sessions	  
Friday,	  22	  March	  
§ Control	  adjudication	  briefing	  for	  move	  #3	  
§ Global	  plenary	  session	  (Move	  #3	  discussion	  and	  lessons	  learned)	  
 
Participant	  List	  
India	  Team	   Pakistan	  Team	  Vice	  Admiral	  
Indian	  Navy,	  Ret.	  
Lieutenant	  General	  
Pakistan	  Army,	  Ret.	  Air	  Vice	  Marshal	  
Indian	  Air	  Force,	  Ret.	  
Lieutenant	  General	  
Pakistan	  Army,	  Ret.	  Brigadier	  General	  
Indian	  Army,	  Ret.	  
Brigadier	  General	  
Pakistan	  Army,	  Ret.	  Brigadier	  General	  
Indian	  Army,	  Ret.	  
Air	  Commodore	  
Pakistan	  Air	  Force,	  Ret.	  Civilian	  Academic	  
Jawaharlal	  Nehru	  University	  
Commodore	  
Pakistan	  Navy,	  Ret.	  Civilian	  Academic	  
Regional	  Centre	  for	  Strategic	  Studies	  
Civilian	  Academic	  
Stanford	  University	  Civilian	  Academic	  
Massachusetts	  Institute	  of	  Technology	  
Civilian	  Academic	  
Quaid-­‐i-­‐Azzam	  University	  	  The	  Control	  Group	  consisted	  of	  active	  and	  retired	  U.S.	  government	  and	  military	  experts	  on	  South	  Asian	  security	  matters.	  	  The	  event	  was	  held	  under	  the	  Chatham	  House	  rule	  of	  non-­‐attribution.	  	  Thus,	  participant	  names	  have	  been	  withheld	  from	  this	  report.	  	  
	   
6	  
GEOPOLITICAL SCENARIO The	  given	  geopolitical	  scenario	  for	  the	  workshop,	  set	  in	  the	  year	  2018,	  was	  not	  dramatically	  different	  from	  today.	  	  Primary	  differences	  included	  reduced	  annual	  Indian	  economic	  growth	  (down	  to	  approximately	  6%	  GDP)	  and	  a	  markedly	  reduced	  U.S.	  footprint	  in	  Afghanistan	  (5,000	  troops;	  mostly	  special	  operations	  forces	  and	  air	  force)	  that	  did	  not	  rely	  on	  Pakistani	  ground	  lines	  of	  communication	  for	  resupply.	  	  Territorial	  disputes	  between	  India	  and	  Pakistan,	  namely	  Kashmir	  and	  Sir	  Creek,	  remained	  unresolved.	  The	  geopolitical	  scenario	  also	  highlighted	  a	  significant	  chill	  in	  Pakistan-­‐Afghanistan	  and	  India-­‐China	  relations.	  	  Pakistan’s	  relations	  with	  Afghanistan	  suffered	  in	  early	  2018	  after	  the	  Afghan	  President	  made	  a	  provocative	  speech	  renewing	  the	  Durand	  Line	  dispute	  and	  deployed	  troops	  to	  reinforce	  the	  border.	  	  Sino-­‐Indian	  territorial	  disputes	  over	  Arunachal	  Pradesh	  and	  Aksai	  Chin	  were	  also	  unresolved	  and	  remained	  a	  source	  of	  tension,	  particularly	  as	  China	  continued	  its	  militarization	  of	  the	  Tibetan	  plateau	  and	  infrastructure	  development	  with	  Pakistan	  (e.g.	  the	  Karakoram	  Highway).	  	  Sino-­‐Indian	  relations	  further	  degraded	  as	  Chinese	  dam	  construction	  on	  the	  upper	  Brahmaputra	  River	  caused	  water	  diversion	  issues	  for	  India.	  	  
Military	  Capabilities1	  In	  2018,	  the	  conventional	  military	  asymmetry	  between	  Pakistan	  and	  India	  has	  widened	  on	  the	  land,	  air,	  and	  sea.	  	  Accordingly,	  Pakistan	  has	  continued	  its	  investment	  in	  tactical	  nuclear	  weapons	  (TNW)	  and	  delivery	  systems,	  such	  as	  the	  60km	  Hatf-­‐IX/Nasr	  SRBM.	  Both	  teams	  in	  the	  South	  Asian	  Stability	  Workshop	  were	  provided	  with	  an	  order	  of	  battle	  (OOB)	  –	  an	  exhaustive	  inventory	  of	  Indian	  and	  Pakistani	  military	  assets	  in	  2018.	  	  The	  Indian	  Army	  was	  provided	  with	  four	  combat-­‐ready	  Integrated	  Battle	  Groups	  (IBGs),	  drawn	  from	  the	  three	  strike	  corps	  but	  in	  situ	  with	  the	  defensive	  corps.	  	  The	  IBGs	  comprised	  of	  armor,	  mechanized	  infantry,	  self-­‐propelled	  artillery,	  special	  operations	  forces,	  helicopters,	  and	  support	  services,	  designed	  for	  rapid,	  high-­‐intensity,	  cross-­‐border	  punitive	  operations.	  	  The	  four	  IBGs	  were	  located	  in	  strategic	  points	  along	  the	  international	  border:	  	  Pathankot,	  Ferozepur,	  Suratgarh,	  and	  Jaisalmer.	  Other	  key	  Indian	  military	  capabilities	  in	  2018	  under	  the	  given	  OOB	  included:	  
• Increased	  mobility	  of	  mechanized	  and	  armored	  forces.	  (T-­‐90s)	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
1	  Estimates	  for	  the	  2018	  OOB	  were	  drawn	  from	  open	  sources,	  including	  IISS	  and	  Jane’s.	  
2 Walter C. Ladwig III, “A Cold Start for Hot Wars? The Indian Army’s New Limited War Doctrine,” International 
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• One	  infantry	  division	  has	  been	  improved	  with	  Futuristic	  Infantry	  Soldier	  as	  a	  System	  (F-­‐INSAS),	  a	  high-­‐tech	  uniform	  and	  equipment	  system.	  	  
• Aviation	  improved	  due	  to	  attack	  and	  transport	  helicopter	  procurement	  (Apache	  
Longbow,	  Chinook).	  	  
• Communications	  enhanced	  due	  to	  improved	  electronic	  signals	  intelligence	  (ELINT)	  and	  airborne	  warning	  and	  control	  systems	  (AWACS).	  	  
• Increased	  number	  of	  multi-­‐role	  fixed-­‐wing	  aircraft.	  	  
• Deployment	  of	  an	  additional	  aircraft	  carrier	  (total	  of	  2)	  has	  yielded	  greater	  blue-­‐water	  capability	  for	  the	  Indian	  Navy.	  	  
• Nuclear	  triad	  complete	  with	  one	  operational	  nuclear-­‐powered	  ballistic	  missile	  submarine	  (SSBN	  Arihant).	  	  
• Increased	  long-­‐range	  strategic	  nuclear	  force	  capability;	  focused	  on	  IRBMs	  and	  ICBMs,	  such	  as	  the	  Agni-­‐V.	  	  
• Indigenous	  BMD	  point	  defense	  capability	  (additional	  satellites	  and	  6	  interceptor	  batteries;	  3	  each	  in	  New	  Delhi	  and	  Mumbai).	  The	  Pakistani	  military	  also	  enjoyed	  enhanced	  capabilities	  under	  the	  2018	  OOB,	  but	  substantial	  conventional	  force	  asymmetry	  remained	  in	  India’s	  favor.	  	  In	  order	  to	  mitigate	  this	  imbalance,	  Pakistan	  had	  made	  significant	  strides	  in	  its	  nuclear	  capability.	  	  The	  OOB	  provided	  Pakistan	  with	  some	  mechanized	  forces,	  specialized	  for	  rapid	  mobilization,	  which	  reinforced	  the	  border	  garrisons	  in	  Gujranwala,	  Okara,	  Pano	  Aqil,	  and	  Bahawalpur.	  	  These	  garrisons	  were	  specifically	  intended	  to	  hedge	  against	  Indian	  IBGs	  deployed	  along	  the	  international	  border.	  Key	  Pakistani	  military	  capabilities	  under	  the	  2018	  OOB	  included:	  
• Enhanced	  air	  defense	  capability	  for	  the	  Pakistan	  Army	  (SAM	  and	  AA	  guns).	  	  
• Increased	  artillery	  firepower	  (nuclear-­‐capable).	  	  
• Slightly	  improved	  intelligence,	  surveillance,	  and	  reconnaissance	  (ISR)	  via	  unmanned	  aerial	  vehicles	  (UAVs),	  but	  real-­‐time	  information	  capability	  remains	  negligible.	  	  	  
• Additional	  squadrons	  of	  JF-­‐17.	  	  
• Agosta	  submarine	  with	  cruise	  missile	  capability	  has	  been	  introduced,	  but	  the	  navy	  enjoys	  very	  little	  power	  projection.	  	  
• Seven	  P-­‐3	  Orions	  and	  enhanced	  AWACS.	  	  
• Significant	  increases	  in	  fissile	  production	  (plutonium-­‐based)	  and	  SRBMs.	  Hatf-­‐IX/Nasr)	  is	  operational	  and	  can	  deliver	  TNW	  to	  battlefield	  targets.	  	  
• Cruise	  missile	  development:	  Hatf-­‐VIII/Ra’ad	  (ALCM);	  Hatf-­‐XII/Babur	  (LACM);	  Hatf-­‐X	  (SLCM).	  	  (Note	  that	  a	  Hatf-­‐X	  does	  not	  exist	  in	  2013,	  but	  the	  Control	  Group	  granted	  the	  Pakistan	  team	  this	  SLCM	  capability	  in	  the	  simulation).	  	  
• Pakistan	  asserts	  centralized	  command	  and	  control	  (C2)	  of	  nuclear	  forces.	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POLITICAL GUIDANCE The	  country	  teams	  were	  provided	  with	  political	  guidance	  to	  ensure	  that	  the	  diplomatic	  and	  military	  plans	  each	  side	  produced	  during	  each	  move	  were	  not	  unrealistic.	  	  For	  the	  purposes	  of	  the	  simulation,	  each	  team’s	  political	  guidance	  was	  considered	  a	  “restricted”	  document;	  that	  is,	  the	  India	  team	  did	  not	  have	  access	  to	  the	  Pakistan	  team’s	  political	  guidance,	  and	  vice-­‐versa.	  
	  
India	  Political	  Guidance	  The	  India	  team	  was	  given	  six	  key	  political	  guidelines	  to	  adhere	  to	  while	  drafting	  their	  diplomatic/military	  plans:	  
• High	  potential	  for	  terrorist	  attack	  exists,	  and	  if	  such	  an	  attack	  occurs,	  it	  cannot	  go	  unanswered	  militarily	  due	  to	  the	  political	  ramifications	  of	  inaction.	  	  
• The	  political-­‐military	  strategy	  should	  portray	  Pakistan	  as	  aggressor.	  	  
• The	  military	  response	  must	  be	  swift	  and	  decisive.	  	  IBGs	  exist	  for	  this	  purpose,	  but	  must	  be	  employed	  judiciously.	  	  
• Military	  plans	  should	  maintain	  balance	  of	  forces	  on	  both	  frontiers,	  in	  case	  of	  Chinese	  opportunism.	  	  
• Military	  operations	  must	  not	  cross	  the	  Pakistani	  nuclear	  threshold	  or	  modify	  the	  territorial	  status	  quo.	  	  The	  military	  operation	  must	  be	  punitive	  in	  action.	  	  
• The	  end	  result	  of	  the	  military	  plans	  should	  deter	  Pakistan	  from	  the	  future	  use	  of	  subconventional	  actors	  as	  a	  tool	  of	  state	  policy.	  	  
Pakistan	  Political	  Guidance	  The	  Pakistan	  team	  was	  also	  given	  five	  key	  political	  guidelines	  to	  adhere	  to	  while	  drafting	  their	  diplomatic/military	  plans:	  
• Repel	  invading	  Indian	  forces	  and	  deter	  India	  from	  future	  acts	  of	  aggression.	  	  
• Mount	  a	  diplomatic	  offensive	  to	  internationalize	  the	  crisis,	  portraying	  India	  as	  the	  aggressor	  and	  Pakistan	  as	  the	  victim	  of	  circumstance.	  	  
• Military	  plans	  should	  maintain	  balance	  of	  forces	  on	  both	  frontiers,	  in	  case	  of	  Afghan	  opportunism.	  	  
• Keep	  the	  nuclear	  threshold	  high,	  but	  showcase	  Pakistan’s	  diverse	  nuclear	  capability	  and	  signal	  deterrence.	  	  
• Nuclear	  C2	  is	  centralized.	  	  Decentralization	  of	  C2,	  if	  necessary,	  must	  be	  approved	  by	  the	  National	  Command	  Authority	  (NCA).	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CRISIS TRIGGERING EVENT 
	  The	  trigger	  event	  was	  designed	  by	  the	  Control	  Group	  to	  suddenly	  escalate	  diplomatic	  tensions	  between	  India	  and	  Pakistan	  just	  short	  of	  war.	  	  The	  Control	  Group	  briefed	  the	  trigger	  event	  to	  both	  country	  teams,	  and	  team	  planning	  for	  Move	  #1	  began	  immediately	  thereafter.	  	  The	  trigger	  event	  was	  as	  follows.	  On	  Thursday,	  November	  22,	  2018,	  a	  cricket	  match	  is	  held	  between	  India	  and	  Pakistan	  at	  Sawai	  Mansingh	  Stadium	  in	  Jaipur.	  	  Meant	  as	  a	  symbolic	  gesture	  of	  friendship	  and	  rapprochement	  between	  the	  two	  countries,	  the	  match	  is	  attended	  by	  the	  Indian	  Prime	  Minister,	  several	  senior	  cabinet	  officials,	  and	  the	  Pakistani	  High	  Commissioner	  to	  India.	  At	  dusk,	  halfway	  through	  the	  match,	  six	  gunmen	  wearing	  Indian	  security	  force	  uniforms	  run	  onto	  the	  field	  and	  open	  fire	  with	  automatic	  weapons.	  	  Grenades	  are	  thrown	  into	  the	  VIP	  stands,	  and	  the	  stadium	  catches	  fire.	  Although	  the	  Indian	  Prime	  Minister	  and	  Pakistani	  High	  Commissioner	  to	  India	  escape	  unharmed,	  the	  Indian	  defense	  minister	  is	  killed,	  as	  well	  as	  hundreds	  of	  spectators	  in	  a	  stampede	  after	  the	  stadium	  catches	  fire.	  	  Others	  killed	  include	  a	  Pakistani	  singer,	  an	  Indian	  actress,	  and	  cricketers	  on	  both	  teams.	  Four	  of	  the	  six	  terrorists	  are	  killed,	  and	  the	  two	  that	  escaped	  go	  underground.	  	  As	  a	  manhunt	  unfolds	  in	  India,	  the	  Pakistani	  government	  condemns	  the	  attack	  and	  urges	  for	  calm.	  No	  party	  claims	  responsibility	  for	  the	  attack.	  The	  Pakistani	  media	  speculates	  that	  right	  wing	  Hindu	  extremists	  (Vishva	  Hindu	  Parishad,	  or	  VHP)	  are	  responsible,	  but	  India	  blames	  Lashkar-­‐e-­‐Taiba	  (LeT),	  claiming	  it	  has	  intercepted	  a	  communication	  from	  the	  two	  escaped	  gunmen.	  	  Further,	  Indian	  intelligence	  concludes	  that	  some	  Pakistani	  government	  officials	  were	  complicit	  in	  the	  attack.	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GAME SYNOPSIS The	  simulation	  begins	  with	  the	  abovementioned	  crisis	  triggering	  event	  –	  a	  terrorist	  attack	  at	  a	  cricket	  match	  in	  Jaipur	  in	  November	  2018	  that	  kills	  the	  Indian	  defense	  minister	  and	  hundreds	  of	  spectators.	  	  Evidence	  traces	  the	  attack	  to	  Lashkar-­‐e-­‐Taiba	  (LeT)	  in	  Pakistan,	  and	  Indian	  intelligence	  claims	  that	  some	  elements	  of	  the	  Pakistani	  government	  were	  complicit.	  	  Diplomacy	  fails	  to	  defuse	  tensions;	  the	  India	  team	  subsequently	  enforces	  a	  “Maritime	  Exclusion	  Zone”	  (MEZ)	  off	  the	  Makran	  coast	  and	  begins	  air,	  artillery,	  and	  special	  forces	  strikes	  against	  Pakistani	  infrastructure	  and	  military	  targets	  along	  the	  Line	  of	  Control	  (LoC)	  in	  Kashmir.	  	  Specific	  targets	  included	  brigade	  headquarters,	  bridges,	  and	  alleged	  terrorist	  training	  camps.	  	  The	  Pakistan	  team	  was	  surprised	  by	  the	  intensity	  of	  India’s	  operations	  and	  interpreted	  them	  as	  formal	  acts	  of	  war.	  	  This	  reconfirms	  how	  non-­‐state	  actors	  such	  as	  LeT	  could	  trigger	  a	  major	  crisis	  in	  South	  Asia	  at	  a	  moment’s	  notice.	  Over	  three	  moves	  spanning	  nine	  “in-­‐game”	  days,	  what	  began	  as	  a	  limited	  war	  escalated	  quickly	  to	  a	  full-­‐scale	  war.	  	  Although	  the	  India	  team’s	  initial	  intent	  was	  to	  conduct	  limited,	  punitive	  strikes	  against	  Pakistan,	  military	  necessity	  on	  both	  sides	  led	  to	  extensive	  mobilizations	  and	  horizontal	  escalation.	  	  By	  the	  end	  of	  the	  third	  move,	  Pakistan	  was	  preparing	  to	  release	  warheads	  to	  its	  Strategic	  Forces	  Commands,	  readying	  nuclear	  missile	  launchers	  for	  possible	  battlefield	  deployment,	  and	  conducting	  nuclear	  signaling	  through	  missile	  tests	  and	  public	  statements.	  	  The	  exercise	  concluded	  at	  this	  point	  when	  neither	  side	  was	  able	  to	  terminate	  the	  war	  on	  its	  terms.	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CONCLUSIONS AND OBSERVATIONS 
On	  Limited	  War	  India’s	  “Cold	  Start”	  or	  “Proactive”	  operational	  doctrine	  envisions	  a	  limited,	  punitive	  war	  in	  response	  to	  Pakistani	  provocation,	  such	  as	  a	  terrorist	  attack.	  2	  	  Pakistan’s	  failure	  to	  control	  non-­‐state	  actors	  such	  as	  the	  LeT	  means	  that	  a	  terrorist	  attack	  could	  occur	  at	  any	  time,	  provoking	  India	  to	  initiate	  hostilities.	  	  India	  believes	  it	  will	  be	  able	  to	  tightly	  control	  escalation	  and	  avoid	  triggering	  nuclear	  redlines	  during	  such	  a	  conflict.3	  	  What	  begins	  as	  a	  limited	  war,	  however,	  is	  likely	  to	  escalate	  vertically	  and	  horizontally,	  potentially	  crossing	  nuclear	  thresholds	  in	  the	  process.	  	  The	  interactions	  and	  decisions	  of	  the	  country	  teams	  during	  the	  simulation	  appear	  to	  confirm	  this	  hypothesis.	  Over	  three	  moves	  spanning	  nine	  “in-­‐game”	  days,	  the	  Indian	  and	  Pakistani	  teams	  escalated	  quickly	  to	  a	  full-­‐scale	  war	  after	  the	  22	  November	  terrorist	  attack	  in	  Jaipur.	  	  Although	  the	  India	  team’s	  initial	  intent	  was	  to	  conduct	  limited,	  punitive	  strikes,	  military	  necessity	  on	  both	  sides	  led	  to	  extensive	  mobilizations	  and	  horizontal	  escalation.	  	  By	  the	  end	  of	  the	  third	  move,	  Pakistan	  was	  preparing	  to	  release	  warheads	  to	  its	  Strategic	  Forces	  Commands,	  readying	  nuclear	  missile	  launchers	  for	  possible	  battlefield	  deployment,	  and	  signaling	  nuclear	  resolve	  through	  missile	  tests	  and	  public	  statements.	  	  The	  exercise	  concluded	  at	  this	  point	  when	  neither	  side	  was	  able	  to	  terminate	  the	  war	  on	  its	  terms.	  	  The	  results	  of	  the	  
South	  Asian	  Stability	  Workshop	  reveal	  that	  a	  single	  crisis-­‐triggering	  event,	  such	  as	  a	  terrorist	  attack,	  can	  quickly	  push	  the	  region	  to	  the	  brink	  of	  a	  nuclear	  exchange.	  	  	  India	  and	  Pakistan’s	  adversarial	  relationship	  and	  security-­‐centric	  thinking	  are	  largely	  derived	  from	  mutual	  non-­‐assurance.	  	  Pakistan	  cannot	  assure	  India	  there	  will	  not	  be	  a	  subconventional	  attack;	  India	  cannot	  assure	  Pakistan	  that	  it	  will	  not	  retaliate	  conventionally	  to	  a	  subconventional	  attack;	  and	  Pakistan	  cannot	  assure	  India	  that	  conventional	  war	  will	  not	  cross	  Pakistan’s	  nuclear	  threshold.	  At	  any	  rate,	  the	  notion	  that	  a	  limited	  war	  can	  be	  fought	  and	  won	  in	  South	  Asia,	  and	  concluded	  on	  one	  side’s	  terms,	  is	  dubious	  and	  has	  dangerous	  implications.	  	  Four	  key	  factors,	  observed	  in	  action	  during	  the	  simulation	  exercise,	  support	  this	  assertion.	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Enduring	  Rivalry	  First,	  the	  enduring	  rivalry,	  chronic	  mistrust,	  and	  charged	  emotions	  between	  India	  and	  Pakistan	  can	  encourage	  excessive	  military	  actions	  during	  wartime.	  	  The	  India	  team,	  for	  example,	  began	  Move	  #1	  with	  a	  Maritime	  Exclusion	  Zone	  (MEZ)	  against	  the	  entire	  Pakistani	  coastline	  with	  a	  combined	  fleet	  and	  heavy	  punitive	  air-­‐land	  strikes	  on	  Pakistani	  troop	  locations	  across	  the	  LoC.	  	  The	  India	  team	  highlighted	  the	  need	  to	  inflict	  “cumulative	  retribution”	  on	  Pakistan	  in	  return	  for	  decades	  of	  provocation.	  	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  however,	  the	  India	  team	  emphasized	  that	  it	  had	  no	  designs	  to	  change	  the	  territorial	  status	  quo	  with	  Pakistan	  and	  that	  its	  military	  objectives	  were	  limited	  and	  punitive.	  The	  Pakistan	  team	  dismissed	  India’s	  declaration	  of	  limited	  intent.	  	  Fearing	  a	  ground	  invasion,	  Pakistan	  launched	  a	  preemptive	  attack	  in	  Move	  #2	  across	  the	  international	  border	  against	  an	  Indian	  formation,	  although	  India	  had	  exclusively	  been	  focusing	  its	  offensive	  ground	  and	  air	  operations	  across	  the	  LoC.	  	  Cognitive	  biases	  exerted	  upward	  escalatory	  pressure	  during	  our	  simulation	  and	  could	  have	  a	  similar	  real-­‐world	  effect.	  Even	  during	  peacetime,	  enduring	  rivalries	  heighten	  bilateral	  tensions	  and	  undermine	  deterrence	  stability.	  	  By	  assuming	  the	  worst	  from	  one	  another,	  India	  and	  Pakistan	  exacerbate	  their	  security	  dilemma	  and	  ensnare	  themselves	  in	  a	  perpetual	  action-­‐reaction	  cycle	  of	  arms	  development.	  	  
Military	  Necessity	  Second,	  limited	  war	  for	  India	  is	  a	  full-­‐scale,	  existential	  war	  for	  Pakistan,	  given	  India’s	  present	  and	  growing	  conventional	  force	  advantage.	  	  The	  Pakistan	  team,	  for	  example,	  argued	  during	  Move	  #1	  that	  it	  was	  militarily	  necessary	  to	  prepare	  its	  forces	  for	  the	  worst	  case	  of	  Indian	  aggression.	  	  Indeed,	  the	  India	  team	  struck	  Pakistani	  military	  targets	  in	  Move	  #1,	  which	  was	  perceived	  as	  an	  act	  of	  war	  and	  escalated	  accordingly.	  	  Thus	  the	  geography,	  target	  set,	  and	  intensity	  of	  an	  Indian	  military	  operation	  shapes	  Pakistan’s	  military	  response	  and	  nuclear	  posture.	  	  This	  report	  concludes	  that	  if	  India	  had	  limited	  its	  aggression	  to	  one-­‐off	  airstrikes	  against	  terrorist	  targets	  in	  the	  disputed	  territory	  of	  Jammu	  and	  Kashmir	  –	  as	  opposed	  to	  targeting	  the	  Pakistani	  military	  –	  the	  crisis	  might	  have	  remained	  limited.	  	  
Escalation	  Control	  is	  Illusive	  Third,	  the	  concept	  of	  limited	  war	  assumes	  a	  significant	  degree	  of	  escalation	  control,	  which	  is	  difficult	  to	  exert	  during	  armed	  conflict.	  	  The	  India	  team,	  for	  example,	  was	  intent	  on	  extracting	  concessions	  from	  the	  Pakistan	  team	  from	  the	  outset	  of	  hostilities	  (e.g.	  the	  extradition	  of	  LeT	  leadership	  to	  New	  Delhi	  for	  trial).	  	  Extracting	  concessions,	  however,	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relies	  on	  coercion,	  which	  exacerbates	  escalation	  rather	  than	  limiting	  it.	  	  In	  its	  fixation	  to	  punish	  Pakistan,	  India	  may	  also	  lack	  a	  clear	  and	  practicable	  war	  de-­‐escalation	  strategy,	  believing	  that	  the	  international	  community	  will	  play	  this	  role	  in	  its	  favor.	  In	  addition,	  India’s	  conventional	  force	  advantage	  creates	  a	  dilemma	  regarding	  force	  employment.	  	  The	  temptation	  to	  employ	  forces	  maximally	  on	  land,	  sea,	  and/or	  air	  in	  order	  to	  achieve	  a	  quick	  and	  decisive	  effect	  is	  very	  high,	  but	  doing	  so	  creates	  an	  escalation	  spiral	  that	  makes	  war	  termination	  difficult.	  	  The	  India	  team	  grappled	  with	  this	  dilemma	  during	  the	  simulation	  but	  nevertheless	  launched	  a	  punitive	  military	  operation	  in	  Move	  #1.	  	  	  Another	  blow	  to	  escalation	  control	  is	  the	  pervasive	  yet	  dubious	  belief	  that	  air	  and	  maritime	  actions	  are	  inherently	  less	  escalatory	  than	  land	  operations.	  	  India	  maintains	  a	  diverse	  suite	  of	  air	  and	  maritime	  response	  options,	  which	  can	  rapidly	  escalate	  a	  bilateral	  crisis	  and	  potentially	  violate	  nuclear	  redlines.	  	  As	  the	  simulation	  demonstrated,	  the	  India	  team’s	  airstrikes	  against	  Pakistan	  military	  targets	  and	  the	  enforcement	  of	  the	  MEZ	  off	  the	  Makran	  coast	  were	  deemed	  by	  the	  Pakistan	  team	  as	  acts	  of	  war,	  whereas	  the	  India	  team	  deemed	  these	  actions	  as	  restrained,	  justified,	  and	  short	  of	  war.	  	  As	  Pakistan	  seeks	  to	  enhance	  its	  strategic	  depth	  by	  strengthening	  its	  navy	  and	  developing	  a	  sea-­‐based	  nuclear	  deterrent,	  the	  implications	  of	  escalation	  in	  the	  maritime	  realm	  in	  South	  Asia	  become	  increasingly	  dire.	  	  
Low	  Nuclear	  Threshold	  Fourth,	  as	  a	  limited	  war	  escalates	  horizontally	  and	  vertically,	  Pakistan	  will	  face	  intense	  pressure	  to	  lower	  the	  nuclear	  threshold.	  	  Pakistan	  may	  opt	  to	  signal	  nuclear	  resolve	  through	  public	  statements,	  missile	  tests,	  and	  by	  threatening	  field	  deployment	  of	  delivery	  systems,	  such	  as	  the	  Hatf-­‐IX/Nasr	  –	  all	  of	  which	  occurred	  during	  the	  simulation.	  	  Lowering	  the	  nuclear	  threshold	  and	  simultaneously	  signaling	  deterrence	  can	  result	  in	  inadvertent	  or	  deliberate	  escalation	  culminating	  in	  a	  nuclear	  exchange.	  
	  
Initial	  Escalation	  Dynamics,	  Post-­‐Trigger	  Event	  The	  Pakistan	  team	  suggested	  that	  even	  though	  it	  had	  developed	  distinct	  “low”	  and	  “high”	  option	  baseline	  military	  plans	  at	  the	  outset	  of	  the	  simulation	  (just	  as	  the	  India	  team	  had	  also	  been	  instructed	  to	  do),	  the	  uncertainty	  regarding	  the	  Indian	  response	  meant	  that	  Pakistan	  had	  no	  choice	  but	  to	  prepare	  itself	  to	  meet	  an	  Indian	  maximal	  option.	  In	  the	  geopolitical	  scenario	  provided	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  simulation	  (set	  in	  the	  year	  2018),	  there	  was	  a	  10-­‐year	  duration	  in	  which	  no	  major	  Pakistan-­‐traced	  terror	  attacks	  took	  place	  against	  India.	  	  Nevertheless,	  the	  India	  team	  reacted	  to	  the	  trigger	  event	  (the	  November	  2018	  terrorist	  attack	  in	  Jaipur)	  with	  a	  significant	  punitive	  military	  operation	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against	  Pakistan	  during	  Move	  #1,	  including	  a	  MEZ	  and	  joint	  strikes	  against	  Pakistani	  brigade	  HQs	  across	  the	  LoC.	  	  For	  the	  Pakistan	  team,	  this	  amounted	  to	  a	  formal	  act	  of	  war.	  The	  Pakistan	  team	  had	  expected	  India	  to	  retaliate,	  perhaps	  against	  the	  terrorist	  source	  of	  the	  Jaipur	  attack,	  but	  they	  felt	  that	  the	  India	  team	  went	  too	  far	  by	  striking	  against	  Pakistani	  soldiers,	  who	  had	  nothing	  to	  do	  with	  the	  Jaipur	  incident.	  	  Attacking	  the	  military	  indicated	  that	  India	  held	  the	  Pakistani	  state	  responsible	  for	  the	  Jaipur	  attack.	  The	  Pakistan	  team	  believed	  that	  India’s	  targeting	  of	  the	  Pakistani	  military	  during	  Move	  #1	  was	  both	  inappropriate	  and	  disproportionate	  given	  the	  10-­‐year	  duration	  without	  terrorist	  incident.	  	  	  The	  India	  team,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  cited	  the	  need	  to	  inflict	  “cumulative	  retribution,”	  pointing	  out	  that	  India’s	  patience	  with	  Pakistan	  was	  thin	  given	  its	  25	  years	  of	  support	  for	  jihadist	  elements.	  	  The	  India	  team	  also	  pointed	  out	  an	  Indian	  intelligence	  report	  during	  the	  simulation	  indicated	  that	  elements	  of	  the	  Pakistani	  government	  had	  knowledge	  of	  the	  impending	  attack	  in	  Jaipur;	  to	  the	  India	  team,	  this	  meant	  that	  the	  Jaipur	  attack	  was	  sponsored	  by	  the	  Pakistani	  state,	  which	  provided	  India’s	  casus	  belli	  for	  attacking	  Pakistani	  brigade	  HQs	  in	  Kashmir.	  	  In	  short,	  the	  India	  team	  argued	  that	  the	  Jaipur	  attack	  was	  a	  Pakistani	  act	  of	  war,	  whereas	  the	  Pakistan	  team	  portrayed	  India’s	  disproportionate	  aggression	  during	  Move	  #1	  as	  an	  act	  of	  war.	  The	  India	  team	  provided	  additional	  explanations	  for	  attacking	  Pakistani	  military	  targets	  instead	  of	  LeT	  strongholds:	  	  (1)	  LeT	  targets	  are	  difficult	  to	  discern,	  (2)	  destroying	  them	  would	  have	  negligible	  deleterious	  impact	  on	  the	  LeT,	  and	  (3)	  attacking	  LeT	  targets	  alone	  would	  not	  deter	  the	  Pakistan	  government	  from	  supporting	  terrorist	  organizations	  in	  the	  future.	  	  In	  other	  words,	  terrorism	  is	  the	  symptom,	  and	  the	  Pakistani	  military	  was	  deemed	  the	  source	  of	  the	  problem.	  The	  Pakistan	  team	  argued	  that	  even	  if	  some	  elements	  or	  individuals	  in	  the	  Pakistani	  government	  had	  supposed	  prior	  knowledge	  of	  the	  terrorist	  attack	  in	  Jaipur,	  this	  does	  not	  equate	  to	  Pakistan	  government	  complicity	  in	  the	  attack	  itself.	  	  Pakistani	  government	  officials	  might	  have	  easily	  dismissed	  threats	  and	  indicators	  of	  an	  impending	  terrorist	  attack	  as	  mere	  “chatter.”	  	  In	  the	  words	  of	  one	  Pakistan	  team	  participant,	  “[Government]	  negligence	  is	  not	  the	  same	  as	  complicity.”	  	  
Perception	  and	  Escalation	  	  The	  intensity	  of	  India’s	  Move	  #1	  plans	  surprised	  the	  Pakistan	  team,	  which	  did	  not	  expect	  India	  to	  implement	  a	  Maritime	  Exclusion	  Zone	  or	  attack	  Pakistani	  military	  targets.	  	  Although	  the	  India	  team	  was	  actually	  employing	  a	  version	  of	  its	  “low”	  option	  during	  Move	  #1,	  the	  Pakistan	  team	  perceived	  it	  to	  be	  so	  disproportionate	  that	  India	  must	  be	  employing	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its	  maximal	  option.	  	  As	  one	  participant	  concluded	  after	  the	  simulation,	  the	  India	  team’s	  low	  and	  high	  options	  were	  essentially	  a	  high	  and	  high	  prime.	  It	  is	  unlikely	  that	  escalation	  could	  have	  been	  controlled	  if	  the	  India	  team	  had	  more	  effectively	  signaled	  that	  it	  was	  employing	  its	  low	  option.	  	  Regardless	  of	  what	  India	  signaled,	  the	  Pakistan	  team’s	  perception	  was	  that	  India’s	  actions	  were	  disproportionate	  and	  maximal.	  	  Furthermore,	  the	  enduring	  rivalry	  and	  history	  of	  mistrust	  on	  the	  subcontinent	  would	  cause	  Pakistan	  to	  doubt	  the	  veracity	  of	  any	  Indian	  claims,	  as	  occurred	  frequently	  during	  the	  simulation.	  	  Finally,	  an	  employed	  low-­‐end	  option	  can	  easily	  graduate	  and	  escalate	  into	  a	  high	  option	  depending	  on	  how	  the	  conflict	  itself	  progresses	  in	  both	  the	  military	  and	  diplomatic	  realms.	  
	  
Diplomatic	  Strategy	  and	  Military	  Posture	  Beginning	  with	  Move	  #1,	  the	  India	  and	  Pakistan	  teams’	  diplomatic	  strategy	  was	  to	  internationalize	  the	  crisis.	  	  The	  Pakistanis	  hoped	  that	  signaling	  nuclear	  resolve	  and	  capabilities	  would	  induce	  international	  intervention	  to	  cool	  the	  crisis.	  	  The	  Pakistan	  team	  also	  sought	  to	  undermine	  India’s	  casus	  belli	  by	  publicly	  pressing	  the	  India	  team	  to	  provide	  evidence	  of	  LeT	  and	  Pakistani	  government	  complicity	  in	  the	  Jaipur	  terrorist	  attack.	  	  Conversely,	  the	  India	  team’s	  diplomatic	  blitz	  was	  aimed	  at	  discouraging	  international	  intervention,	  in	  order	  to	  allow	  enough	  time	  to	  inflict	  punitive	  measures	  against	  Pakistan.	  	  In	  its	  public	  statements,	  the	  India	  team	  showed	  a	  tendency	  to	  emulate	  language	  used	  by	  the	  United	  States,	  ostensibly	  to	  enhance	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  their	  actions.	  	  For	  instance,	  the	  India	  team	  characterized	  its	  military	  offensive	  as	  “India’s	  war	  on	  terror.”	  	  	  One	  of	  the	  Pakistan	  team’s	  dilemmas	  during	  the	  simulation	  was	  trying	  to	  reconcile	  (1)	  the	  need	  to	  appear	  as	  a	  “victim”	  of	  Indian	  aggression,	  with	  (2)	  the	  desire	  to	  initiate	  a	  proper	  counterattack	  across	  the	  LoC.	  	  Playing	  the	  victim	  and	  adopting	  a	  defensive	  military	  posture	  complemented	  Pakistan’s	  diplomatic	  effort	  to	  elicit	  international	  sympathy.	  
	  
Ground	  Operations	  The	  term	  “Cold	  Start”	  appeared	  only	  once	  during	  the	  simulation:	  	  the	  Pakistan	  team’s	  high-­‐option	  baseline	  plans.	  	  Unsurprisingly,	  the	  India	  team	  did	  not	  mention	  Cold	  Start,	  and	  they	  did	  not	  implement	  it	  as	  the	  doctrine	  is	  currently	  understood.	  	  The	  India	  team	  did	  emphasize,	  however,	  that	  in	  any	  ground	  operation	  across	  the	  international	  border	  into	  Pakistan,	  the	  incursion	  would	  be	  limited	  but	  not	  uniform;	  in	  other	  words,	  the	  incursion	  in	  some	  sectors	  of	  the	  international	  border	  would	  be	  deeper	  than	  in	  others.	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The	  India	  team	  was	  not	  concerned	  that	  China	  might	  launch	  an	  opportunistic	  attack	  during	  the	  simulation;	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  the	  India	  team	  maintained	  their	  eastern	  forces	  in	  situ	  instead	  of	  redeploying	  them	  to	  the	  western	  front.	  	  By	  maintaining	  a	  strategic	  balance	  of	  forces	  across	  the	  country,	  the	  India	  team	  was	  confident	  that	  Chinese	  military	  intervention	  was	  unlikely	  and	  any	  incursion	  could	  be	  repelled.	  	  	  Similarly,	  the	  Pakistan	  team	  was	  unconcerned	  with	  Afghan	  military	  adventurism	  during	  the	  simulation.	  	  Military	  necessity	  in	  the	  conflict	  with	  India	  forced	  Pakistan	  to	  withdraw	  formations	  from	  the	  western	  border	  and	  deploy	  them	  along	  the	  LoC	  and	  international	  border.	  	  Defense	  of	  the	  western	  border	  was	  left	  up	  to	  the	  Frontier	  Corps	  and	  tribal	  lashkars.	  	  The	  Pakistan	  team	  suggested	  that	  if	  the	  Afghan	  National	  Army	  (ANA)	  did	  cross	  the	  border	  and	  captured	  some	  posts,	  Pakistan	  would	  retake	  them	  after	  the	  cessation	  of	  hostilities	  with	  India.4	  
	  
Naval	  Operations	  The	  India	  team	  ordered	  its	  Navy	  to	  enforce	  a	  MEZ	  during	  Move	  #1,	  which	  the	  Pakistan	  team	  interpreted	  as	  an	  act	  of	  war	  equivalent	  to	  a	  blockade.	  	  The	  MEZ	  would	  involve	  boarding	  and	  seizing	  operations	  off	  the	  Makran	  coast	  of	  all	  ships	  bound	  for	  Pakistani	  harbors,	  inflicting	  significant	  economic	  impact.	  	  Additionally,	  the	  India	  team	  opted	  to	  use	  a	  combined	  eastern	  and	  western	  fleet	  to	  enforce	  the	  MEZ.	  	  In	  the	  real	  world,	  staging	  a	  combined	  fleet	  would	  require	  significant	  naval	  movements	  that	  would	  be	  picked	  up	  by	  Pakistani	  intelligence,	  sending	  a	  very	  strong	  escalatory	  signal.	  Securely	  enforcing	  the	  MEZ	  obligated	  India	  to	  counter	  Pakistani	  maritime	  patrol	  aircraft	  (MPA)	  during	  the	  simulation,	  which	  created	  substantial	  escalatory	  risk.	  	  Pakistani	  MPA	  assets,	  such	  as	  the	  P-­‐3	  Orion,	  are	  able	  to	  locate	  hostile	  surface	  and	  sub-­‐surface	  ships	  and	  transmit	  their	  coordinates	  to	  friendly	  units,	  including	  submarines.	  	  Unchallenged	  MPA	  would	  therefore	  allow	  Pakistan	  to	  quickly	  target	  Indian	  vessels	  and	  help	  freighters	  evade	  interdiction.	  	  Accordingly,	  India	  actively	  targeted	  MPA	  and	  shot	  down	  a	  P-­‐3	  during	  Move	  #1.	  Pakistan’s	  deployment	  of	  a	  conventional-­‐armed	  SSGN	  on	  patrol	  within	  the	  MEZ	  during	  Move	  #2	  highlights	  the	  escalatory	  risks	  associated	  with	  dual-­‐use	  weapon	  systems.	  	  Dual-­‐use	  refers	  to	  weapons	  systems	  that	  can	  be	  armed	  with	  either	  conventional	  or	  nuclear	  payloads,	  such	  as	  cruise	  missiles.	  	  Dual-­‐use	  systems	  increase	  battlefield	  uncertainty	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
4	  The	  Control	  Team	  set	  up	  India-­‐China	  and	  Afghanistan-­‐Pakistan	  tensions	  at	  the	  outset	  of	  the	  simulation,	  but	  did	  not	  escalate	  them	  in	  order	  to	  keep	  the	  focus	  on	  the	  interactions	  of	  India	  and	  Pakistan.	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can	  promote	  rapid,	  unintended	  escalation	  on	  land,	  sea,	  or	  air.5	  	  If	  Pakistan’s	  SSGN	  had	  been	  nuclear-­‐armed	  and	  destroyed	  by	  an	  Indian	  surface	  ship	  conducting	  anti-­‐submarine	  warfare,	  escalation	  could	  be	  rapid	  and	  disastrous.	  	  
Air	  Force	  Operations	  The	  India	  team	  stressed	  that	  it	  enjoys	  air	  dominance	  over	  Pakistan	  by	  default,	  thanks	  to	  the	  wide	  qualitative	  and	  quantitative	  asymmetry	  that	  exists	  today	  and	  is	  projected	  to	  deepen	  by	  2018.	  	  The	  India	  team’s	  air	  force	  plan	  during	  the	  simulation	  involved	  luring	  the	  Pakistan	  Air	  Force	  (PAF)	  into	  the	  skies	  where	  they	  could	  be	  destroyed	  by	  the	  Indian	  Air	  Force	  (IAF).	  	  The	  Pakistan	  team,	  cognizant	  of	  the	  threat	  posed	  by	  the	  IAF	  and	  Indian	  air	  defense,	  adopted	  a	  defensive	  posture	  for	  the	  PAF	  and	  indicated	  that	  PAF	  assets	  would	  not	  be	  “frittered	  away”	  on	  deep	  strategic	  conventional	  strikes	  within	  Indian	  territory.	  Air	  dominance	  implies	  that	  India	  would	  need	  to	  neutralize	  Pakistani	  air	  bases	  not	  just	  across	  the	  LoC,	  but	  throughout	  Pakistan	  proper.	  	  So	  long	  as	  Pakistan	  retains	  the	  runway	  infrastructure	  and	  air-­‐breathing	  assets	  to	  conduct	  counter-­‐air	  operations,	  Indian	  air	  dominance	  will	  be	  constantly	  challenged	  during	  a	  conflict.	  Throughout	  the	  simulation,	  the	  Pakistan	  team	  utilized	  its	  air	  force	  in	  a	  primarily	  defensive	  manner,	  eschewing	  deep	  strategic	  strikes	  against	  Indian	  targets	  in	  favor	  of	  providing	  support	  to	  Pakistani	  land	  and	  naval	  operations.	  	  The	  Pakistan	  team’s	  objectives	  were	  to	  preserve	  its	  air	  force	  and	  minimize	  undue	  escalation.	  	  It	  is	  difficult,	  however,	  to	  limit	  vertical	  and	  spatial	  escalation	  in	  the	  air,	  given	  the	  high	  velocities	  and	  absence	  of	  geographic	  obstacles.	  	  As	  one	  participant	  pointed	  out,	  there	  are	  no	  hills	  in	  the	  sky.	  
	  
Nuclear	  Issues	  During	  a	  2002	  interview,	  Khalid	  Kidwai,	  Director-­‐General	  of	  Pakistan’s	  Strategic	  Plans	  Division	  (SPD),	  revealed	  four	  factors	  governing	  Pakistan’s	  use	  of	  nuclear	  weapons.	  	  They	  were	  (1)	  spatial	  ingress	  by	  the	  adversary,	  (2)	  significant	  levels	  of	  destruction,	  (3)	  economic	  strangulation,	  and	  (4)	  domestic	  destabilization.6	  	  	  Although	  the	  Pakistan	  team	  made	  a	  concerted	  effort	  to	  signal	  its	  nuclear	  capability	  and	  credibility	  at	  all	  stages	  of	  the	  simulation	  (including	  missile	  tests	  and	  public	  statements),	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
5	  Iskander	  Rehman,	  “Drowning	  Stability:	  The	  Perils	  of	  Naval	  Nuclearization	  and	  Brinksmanship	  in	  the	  Indian	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  Review	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  Khan,	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  Grass:	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  Bomb	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India	  team	  was	  not	  deterred	  from	  counter-­‐attacking	  across	  the	  international	  border	  during	  Move	  #3	  or	  enforcing	  the	  MEZ.	  	  Even	  readying	  TNW	  delivery	  systems	  such	  as	  Nasr	  for	  potential	  deployment	  during	  Move	  #2	  failed	  to	  limit	  Indian	  aggression.	  	  Although	  the	  Pakistan	  team	  believed	  that	  actual	  deployment	  of	  its	  tactical	  nuclear	  forces	  might	  help	  bring	  about	  international	  intervention	  that	  would	  defuse	  hostilities,	  Pakistan	  did	  not	  exercise	  this	  option	  because	  doing	  so	  risked	  significant	  and	  sudden	  escalation	  with	  India.	  Regardless,	  by	  Move	  #3,	  nuclear	  tensions	  were	  high,	  and	  both	  India	  and	  Pakistan	  had	  operationalized	  their	  triads.	  	  In	  an	  effort	  to	  obtain	  an	  immediate	  ceasefire,	  Pakistan	  offered	  nuclear	  alert	  status	  de-­‐escalation	  as	  a	  bargaining	  chip.	  	  India’s	  war	  termination	  goals,	  however,	  were	  so	  expansive	  that	  it	  was	  unwilling	  to	  entertain	  Pakistani	  ceasefire	  overtures.	  	  This	  report	  concludes	  that	  if	  the	  simulation	  had	  proceeded	  to	  a	  Move	  #4,	  Pakistan	  would	  have	  faced	  pressure	  to	  continue	  escalating	  its	  nuclear	  posture.	  	  The	  possible	  employment	  of	  tactical	  nuclear	  weapons	  in	  such	  a	  situation	  cannot	  be	  ruled	  out.	  Throughout	  the	  simulation,	  the	  India	  team	  appeared	  unfazed	  by	  Pakistan’s	  nuclear	  signaling	  and	  threats	  to	  deploy	  the	  Nasr.	  	  The	  retired	  military	  officers	  on	  the	  India	  team	  indicated	  that	  all	  battlefield-­‐deployed	  Pakistani	  missile	  launchers	  will	  be	  targeted	  during	  an	  armed	  conflict	  irrespective	  of	  whether	  they	  are	  nuclear	  or	  conventional.	  	  Moreover,	  the	  retired	  military	  officers	  on	  the	  India	  team	  were	  unanimous	  that	  the	  detonation	  of	  a	  single	  Pakistani	  TNW	  –	  even	  in	  self-­‐defense	  on	  Pakistani	  territory	  –	  would	  invite	  “massive	  retaliation”	  from	  India.	  	  One	  Pakistani	  participant	  suggested	  that	  massive	  retaliation	  was	  a	  disproportionate	  response	  to	  a	  defensive	  tactical	  nuclear	  blast.	  Both	  sides	  signaled	  they	  were	  willing	  and	  resilient	  enough	  to	  endure	  a	  nuclear	  exchange.	  	  The	  Pakistan	  team	  warned	  it	  would	  harden	  its	  targets	  and	  “fight	  through”;	  the	  India	  team	  expressed	  the	  same.	  	  
	    
South	  Asian	  Stability	  Workshop:	  	  A	  Crisis	  Simulation	  Exercise	  
 
19	  
CAVEATS AND LIMITATIONS The	  participant	  makeup	  of	  each	  country	  team	  (80%	  military	  and	  20%	  academic)	  impacted	  the	  discourse	  at	  the	  event.	  	  There	  were	  no	  regional	  diplomats	  or	  policy	  officials	  in	  attendance.	  	  Participants	  were	  asked	  to	  focus	  their	  moves	  at	  the	  strategic	  and	  operational	  levels	  rather	  than	  provide	  detailed	  tactical	  plans.	  Although	  none	  of	  the	  players	  on	  the	  teams	  were	  active	  duty	  or	  sitting	  government	  officials,	  they	  all	  were	  playing	  within	  the	  context	  of	  the	  extant	  deterrence	  situation	  between	  India	  and	  Pakistan.	  	  Therefore	  it	  is	  likely	  that	  some	  actions	  taken	  and	  statements	  made	  during	  the	  game	  play	  were	  meant	  not	  only	  in	  game	  context	  but	  as	  signals	  in	  the	  broader	  strategic	  context	  between	  Pakistan	  and	  India.	  	  These	  signals	  may	  have	  been	  meant	  for	  U.S.	  observers	  present	  as	  much	  as	  for	  players	  from	  the	  other	  team.	  	  When	  drawing	  conclusions	  from	  the	  
South	  Asian	  Stability	  Workshop,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  keep	  this	  in	  mind.	  Great	  care	  should	  be	  taken	  to	  distinguish	  between	  lessons	  learned	  from	  simulations	  and	  lessons	  learned	  from	  the	  real	  world.	  	  Simulation	  lessons	  should	  be	  looked	  at	  for	  what	  they	  are	  –	  lessons	  from	  an	  artificial	  environment	  with	  a	  number	  of	  significant	  constraints:	  	  at	  the	  very	  least,	  one	  set	  of	  players	  working	  through	  a	  single	  scenario	  one	  time.	  	  That	  said,	  lessons	  from	  simulations	  are	  often	  the	  only	  lessons	  one	  has	  to	  draw	  upon	  when	  addressing	  issues	  related	  to	  war	  and	  escalation	  dynamics.	  	  Real	  wars,	  thankfully,	  are	  relatively	  few	  and	  far	  between,	  and	  examination	  of	  their	  lessons	  is	  often	  fraught	  with	  its	  own	  complications	  and	  distortions.	  
	  
